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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Human Flesh Search Engine is a literal translation of the 
Chinese words Ren Rou Sou Suo Yin Qin ( ).  It is the 
collaborative Internet phenomenon of searching for personal 
information using a combination of human and artificial intelligence.  
Normally, the human flesh search engine is launched in public online 
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forums, where Internet users post various kinds of personal 
information about the victims, such as their names, phone numbers, 
email addresses, physical addresses, photos, and affiliations.1  Often, 
these victims will then be exposed to ethical critiques, public 
humiliation, or even physical assault. 
As opposed to commonly known search engines such as 
Google, Baidu and Bing, 2  the human flesh search engine uses a 
network of Internet users to conduct a search.  There are features of 
the human flesh search engine that make it a unique Internet 
phenomenon.  First, Internet users often employ it in response to a 
wide range of social and political issues, such as government 
corruption, moral debate, patriotism, or celebrity gossip.3  Second, 
using the power of networked Internet users, the collection and 
analysis of personal information can be conducted much more 
effectively than traditional search engines.  Such personal 
information, once available, can be rapidly distributed online, making 
it a powerful mass medium.  Third, with the use of the Internet, the 
human flesh search engine can easily mobilize thousands of Internet 
users, making it very likely that there are some insiders who can 
provide the targets’ personal information without their consent or 
knowledge. 
It should be noted that despite its nefarious uses, the human 
flesh search engine can be used for good, such as reuniting families 
after a natural disaster.  However, in most cases, the human flesh 
search engine is used to expose targets to public humiliation, be they 
public figures or private individuals.  This Note will focus on the 
                                                                                                               
 1 The earliest known use of this term dates back to 2001, when a man posted a thread 
on one of the most popular forums on the Chinese Internet, mop.com, seeking relationship 
advice. The thread included the picture of a beautiful young woman, who was claimed to be 
his girlfriend.  Suspicious Chinese Internet users employed the human flesh search engine to 
identify the young woman was actually a young model, Chen Ziyao.  See “Human Flesh 
Search Engine”: An Internet Lynching?, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY ( ) (Jul. 5, 2008), 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/features/content_15959669.htm [https://perma.cc/3RZK-
46W3] (describing the idea of a search engine comprised of thousands of Internet users intent 
on achieving a single goal and providing illustrative examples, including its origin). 
 2 Id. 
 3 For examples of the human flesh search engine, see Celia Hatton, China’s Internet 
Vigilantes and the ‘Human Flesh Search Engine,’ BBC (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25913472 [https://perma.cc/4FCG-YRDD] 
(describing the dedication of the members of the human search engine and the humiliation 
of the targets). 
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latter in order to highlight the tension between the right to privacy 
and the right to free speech in the Internet age.4 
Privacy and the right to free speech can be thought of as 
distinct topics, but they frequently collide where the Internet is 
concerned. 5   On the one hand, many fragments of personal 
information about individuals are being collected by new 
technologies, then saved in databases and scattered across the Internet.  
These fragments of information are permanent, searchable, and 
subject to computerized cross-reference and retrieval.  On the other 
hand, society is horrified by stories of private photos leaking, cyber-
bullying, cyber-stalking, cyber-harassment, and offensive online 
speech.  With the increase in the number and diversity of Internet 
users, the informal governance mechanisms that have previously 
governed the Internet are quickly being shown to be inadequate.6  
Therefore, it is necessary to carefully explore the tension between 
privacy and speech on the Internet with regard to the kind of 
theoretical structure for legal remedies available. 
By examining the human flesh search engine, this Note 
attempts to explore the tension between privacy and free speech on 
the Internet.  In particular, it focuses on the Wang Fei case—the 
landmark case of the human flesh search engine in China.  The human 
flesh search engine and the Wang Fei case have implications in both 
American and Chinese legal systems.  They represent universal 
                                                                                                               
 4 Public figures were involved in the human flesh search engine usually because of 
misbehavior or corruption.  See Sky Canaves, “Human Flesh Search Engines” Set Their 
Sights on Official Misbehavior, WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME REPORT BLOG (Dec. 29, 2008, 
6:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2008/12/29/human-flesh-search-engines-set-
their-sights-on-official-misbehavior [https://perma.cc/WP2R-FN5F] (reporting that in 2008 
a human flesh search engine conducted a search on a public official in Shenzhen after he was 
caught on video assaulting a young girl at a restaurant); Jessi Levine, What Is a “Human 
Flesh Search,” and How Is It Changing China?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/what-is-a-human-flesh-search-
and-how-is-it-changing-china/263258/ [https://perma.cc/FM3T-NWFP] (reporting that in 
2012, Chinese Internet users conducted a human flesh search against a public official, Yang 
Dacai, after he was found wearing a luxury watch during an inspection for a natural disaster.  
Yang Dacai was later sentenced to fourteen years in prison for bribery). 
 5 The right to privacy has different meanings in the legal academia.  This Note limits 
the inquiry to privacy protection as a way to control dissemination of personal information 
and excludes the discussion of privacy protection as decisional autonomy. 
 6 CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET: HOW TECHNOLOGY, USERS, AND 
BUSINESSES ARE TRANSFORMING THE NETWORK 82–88 (2012) (elaborating on how the 
informal Internet governance mechanisms were replaced by more formal Internet 
governance in three contexts: spam control, the domain name system, and congestion 
management). 
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problems regulating privacy and free speech, and trigger an issue 
which both legal systems have not yet squarely addressed—that is, 
whether the value of privacy outweighs the value of free speech if the 
underlying online speech is about private individuals (as opposed to 
public officials and celebrities) and of private concern (as opposed to 
public concern).  This Note examines this issue through the lens of 
the American legal framework.  Drawing on a comparative analysis, 
this Note attempts to answer the following questions: how should the 
American legal system respond to the tension between privacy and 
free speech in the context of the human flesh search engine?  What 
kinds of remedies can each jurisdiction offer to the victims of the 
human flesh search engine?  Finally, what can Chinese policy makers 
learn from the American legal experience, and how can they provide 
a more cost-effective regulatory framework? 
Part II of this Note begins with an overview of the human 
flesh search engine, and an analysis of the Chinese court’s decisions 
of the Wang Fei case.  This Note uses this case study to reflect on the 
differences between Chinese and American cultures, and their 
individual views on privacy and free speech in the Internet.7 
In the following section (Part III), this Note attempts to 
demonstrate how the Internet makes previously clear doctrines seem 
doubtful, and bends well-settled legal principles about free speech 
and privacy from the pre-Internet age.  In particular, this Note will 
draw distinctions between online speech and off-line speech, speech 
about private individuals and speech about public officials, and 
speech of private concern and speech of public concern.  This Note 
argues that when conducting First Amendment analyses on the 
human flesh search engine, privacy values should trump free speech 
values if the online speech involved a matter about private individuals 
of private concern. 
In Part IV, I discuss possible tort liabilities and related legal 
remedies that could arise in human flesh search engine related cases.  
This Note will mainly focus on the liability of Internet intermediaries 
in the human flesh search engine, with United States’ Section 230 of 
Communication Decency Act as the primary frame of reference. 
                                                                                                               
 7 Sometimes, both of these values achieve the same end.  For example, both embrace 
anonymity and private speech as ways to check unreasonable governmental surveillance.  
Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 64–5 (1959); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305–
7 (1965); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).  But more often, 
privacy and free speech are competing interests. 
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Part V highlights the positive and negative lessons from 
American jurisprudence. These lessons will then be the basis of 
recommendations for the Chinese legislature and courts.  American 
courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, technologists and 
entrepreneurs provide a sophisticated picture of solutions to online 
privacy infringement.  China can learn a great deal from them.  In 
particular, restrictions on online speech should be narrowed more to 
restrictions on speech about private individuals and of private 
concerns.  On the other hand, the United States has been leaning 
towards providing absolute immunity to Internet intermediaries, 
potentially leaving victims of online infringement unprotected.  This 
Note cautions against that.  Drawing on a comparative analysis, this 
Note suggests reforms for the regulation of the human flesh search 
engine in China.  Given the institutional landscape and realities in 
China, this Note argues that a well-designed notice-based liability 
regime for an Internet service provider is a more cost-effective 
approach to address the problems of the human flesh search engine.  
This Note will also suggest that Internet intermediaries shall be 
incentivized to cooperate with victims and law enforcement agencies 
in order to achieve an optimal mechanism.  The conclusion sets out 
final remarks. 
II. THE HUMAN FLESH SEARCH ENGINE AND THE WANG FEI 
CASE 
A. Why the Human Flesh Search Engine Is Popular in China 
In the past decade, there has been an increasing number of 
cases related to the human flesh search engine in China.  One might 
ask: why has the human flesh search engine become such a popular 
Internet phenomenon in China?  Before we begin our discussion, it 
should be noted that online personal information collection and cyber 
harassment are not uniquely Chinese Internet phenomena.  In the 
United States, “doxing,” derived from the word “document tracing,” 
is a similar Internet phenomenon.  It refers to the process of gathering, 
deducing or publishing individuals’ information such as name, date 
of birth, email, physical address, telephone number, photographs, 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] ONLINE PRIVACY AND ONLINE SPEECH 273 
medical information, etc.8  The variance in American and Chinese 
Internet culture accounts for the differences between the human flesh 
search engine and doxing. 
As the first instance of these variations, the demographics of 
Internet users vary widely by country.  After surpassing United States 
in the number of Internet users (253 million) in 2008, 9  China 
continued to increase its advantage in that number.  In 2015, the 
number of Internet users in China hit 706 million, almost equal to the 
combined total of the Internet users in India (354 million), United 
States (284 million), and Japan (115 million).10 Moreover, according 
to a recent survey, Internet users in China are, on average, much 
younger than their United States counterparts.11  With more spare 
time to be spent online and lower mental maturity, younger Internet 
users are more likely to participate in public opprobrium and be 
provoked by aggressive language during the course of the human 
flesh search engine. 
Second, the Internet, as a novel form of media, plays a 
significant role in spreading information about controversial issues in 
China.  Because of the large number of Internet users, bulletin board 
systems (“BBS”) are much more popular on the Chinese Internet than 
the American Internet.  The dearth of contentious and controversial 
                                                                                                               
 8 According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations, “doxing” is the release of 
“identifying information including full name, date of birth, address, and pictures typically 
retrieved from the social networking site profiles of a targeted individual.”  FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT AT RISK FOR HARASSMENT AND IDENTITY 
THEFT THOUGH “DOXING” 1 (2011).  The most famous doxing case in the United States, by 
far, is the so-called “Gamergate”, which is about the harassment of several women in the 
gaming industry online.  See Jay Hathaway, What Is Gamergate, and Why? An Explainer for 
Non-Geeks, GAWKER (Oct. 10, 2014), http://gawker.com/what-is-gamergate-and-why-an-
explainer-for-non-geeks-1642909080 [https://perma.cc/3U8S-2BLE] (explaining the 
“gamergate” movement and its implications). 
 9 See Tom Downey, China’s Cyperposse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html [https://perma.cc/S2GB-
JLJQ] (describing instances where the “human flesh search engine” incited Internet users in 
China). 
 10 Internet Users by Country (2016), INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internet
livestats.com/internet-users-by-country/2015/ [https://perma.cc/28FN-GCWJ] (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2016). 
 11 In 2011, the average age of Internet users in China was below thirty years, while in 
the United States it was thirty-six years.  See 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE 
NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE, 377 (2d ed. 
2011).  See also David Barboza, China Surpasses U.S. in Numbers of Internet Users, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/worldbusiness/26
internet.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/EV23-Q8BN] (describing the population percentage of 
Internet users in China and their demographic information). 
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information in the highly regulated traditional media, such as 
television and newspapers, renders BBS as crucial media outlet for 
Chinese citizens.  Furthermore, the interactive nature of BBS, as well 
as the large number of BBS users (man-power), make BBS an ideal 
platform for the human flesh search engine.  With the help of BBS, 
Internet users are able to post and re-post controversial stories, and 
discuss these stories in a variety of formats including text, image, 
emoji, audio and video.  In many cases, the human flesh search engine 
can even trigger a chain of media reactions, i.e. traditional media such 
as television and newspapers following up with reports about the 
human flesh search engine, thus reinforcing its influence.  For 
instance, the Chinese national television, as well as some mainstream 
newspapers, reported the Wang Fei case after the event was heavily 
discussed on the Internet. 
Third, compared to concerns over political issues, concerns 
over ethical issues are more readily raised on the Chinese Internet and 
are more likely to trigger the human flesh search engine.  In the 
United States, political issues are often at the center of debate on the 
Internet.  By contrast, the majority of online discussion in China 
raises ethical issues and the ethics and values of family and marriage 
appear to be most important to Chinese Internet users.  As some 
commentators noted, most Chinese Internet users are much more 
interested in finding dates, jobs, and entertainment than in engaging 
in political discourse; online discussion about ethical issues is one 
significant area that is unfettered by government regulation. 12  In 
many ways, the human flesh search engine in the Internet age reminds 
us of the Da Zi Bao (Big-character Posters) during the Cultural 
Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.13  In both instances, Chinese 
people are provoked to participate in mob interaction, conduct mass 
intimidation, and seek populist revenge against specific individuals.  
The difference is that the former typically focuses on ethical issues, 
and the latter on political issues.  If political discussion is restricted 
in Chinese public discourse today, then there must be another outlet 
                                                                                                               
 12 Downey, supra note 9. 
 13 The Cultural Revolution was launched in May 1966, in which Chinese citizens 
participated in massive criticisms against bourgeois and corrupt officials.  Most criticisms 
were made through the use of Big-character Posters, which are handwritten, wall-mounted 
posters using large-sized Chinese characters.  See THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS 
HISTORY (Joseph Esherick et al. eds., 2006); ANDREW WALDER. CHINA UNDER MAO: A 
REVOLUTION DERAILED (2015). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] ONLINE PRIVACY AND ONLINE SPEECH 275 
for civil engagement—that is ethical discussion.  The Internet, as 
illustrated by the human flesh search engine, meets the demand of 
such ethical discussion. 
Fourth, the collectivist culture embedded in Chinese society, 
as opposed to the individualist culture of the United States, makes 
Chinese Internet a more suitable ground for the human flesh search 
engine. Numerous sociological and anthropological studies argue that 
Chinese culture emphasizes collectivism, whereas American culture 
emphasizes individualism.14  The human flesh search engine is a 
grassroots, collective phenomenon, where Internet users conduct a 
collaborated search against a person.  A collectivist culture like the 
Chinese is far more likely to trigger collective action.  This is also 
evident when we examine the aggressive actions taken by Chinese 
Internet users whilst using the human flesh search engine. 15  
Moreover, this collectivist-individualist dichotomy can also be 
applied to the analysis of culpability.  As we shall see in the following 
section, the Wang Fei case demonstrates how culpability is located 
not just at the level of the individual (Wang Fei), but also at the level 
of the family unit (his brother, his mother and father), which 
constitutes a kind of distribution of harassment.  This distribution of 
harassment is less likely to happen in the United States, which focuses 
more on individual culpability, rather than assigning culpability on a 
collective level. 
Fifth, let us not forget that the level of development of 
technologies plays a part here.  In the United States, because of the 
advancement of the Internet and related technologies, such as Big 
Data and the Cloud, the capacities to collect and store personal 
information has drastically increased by orders of magnitude in the 
past three decades.  Thus, there is simply more digitalized personal 
information stored on the Internet, gathered either by private 
companies, such as Google and Apple, or by governmental agencies, 
such as the FBI and the NSA.  With more personal information 
collected and saved on the Internet, it is much easier for people to cull 
                                                                                                               
 14 For studies about individualism and collectivism in different cultures, see GEERT 
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED 
VALUES 209–278 (2d ed. 2001); RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND 
POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 67–
108 (1997). 
 15 See, e.g., Downey, supra note 9 (denoting several aggressive acts and threats toward 
targets of the human flesh search engine); infra text accompanying note 21. 
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an information gathering process within the Internet.  However, there 
is still limited personal information collected on the Internet in China.  
This is partly because the Internet technologies are disproportionally 
developed across the country,16 and partly because the majority of 
middle-age people, who are more likely to be the targets of ethically-
related human flesh search engine, do not have a large digital 
footprint before their thirties.  Even if one tries doxing on the Chinese 
Internet against a middle-age person, the chances of success at 
obtaining relatively complete personal information are much lower 
than in the United States. 
In sum, although we can readily find some similar Internet 
phenomenon in other countries, the human flesh search engine is a 
typical Chinese Internet phenomenon.  Among all the Chinese cases 
involving the human flesh search engine, the Wang Fei case is the 
first and most important legal case. 
B. The Wang Fei Case 
On December 29, 2007, Jiang Yan committed suicide in 
Beijing.17  Several days later, her diary, which revealed her misery 
after discovering her husband Wang Fei’s adultery, was posted and 
distributed online by Zhang Leyi.18  Soon after that, Chinese Internet 
users launched the human flesh search engine to locate the cheating 
husband.19  The posts and reposts of this affair elicited thousands of 
responses on several BBS in the following few days, and Wang Fei 
soon found himself at the top of a “most wanted” list on the Chinese 
Internet.20  The angry Internet users sniffed out and posted his photos, 
home and work addresses, phone numbers, student identity number, 
                                                                                                               
 16 This is the “digital divide”, which refers to the differences between those who have 
access to, use of, or impact on the Internet and those who do not have such privileges.  
Generally speaking, the digital divide is more evident in developing countries.  See Michelle 
W. L. Fong, Digital Divide: The Case of Developing Countries, 6 ISSUES IN INFORMING SCI. 
INFO. TECH. 471, 476 (2009). 
 17 Renrou Sousuo Diyi An ( ) [The First Human Flesh Search Engine 
Case], BAIDU BAIKE ( ), http://baike.baidu.com/view/3107502.htm [https://
perma.cc/8EVW-PLRV]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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national identity number, and even his brother’s license-plate number 
on major online portals.21  Two of these online portals stood out. 
The first online portal was tianya.cn (“Tianya”), a leading and 
most widely read Chinese BBS, which, at the time, had 
approximately 11 million weekly visits.  Much of the information 
transmitted over Tianya originates with the website’s millions of 
registered users.  In early January of 2008, Wang Fei’s name was first 
revealed in an online post in Tianya, and other personal information 
of him and his mistress was disclosed shortly after.22  One early 
comment by an anonymous user read, “We should take revenge on 
that couple and drown them in our sputa”.23  Another Internet user 
called for mob justice: “Those in Beijing, please share with others the 
scandal of these two. Make it impossible for them to stay in this 
city”. 24   Vulgar insults like “F*** your mother” 25 , “D*** your 
family” 26  and “You are the murder[er]” 27  were directed towards 
Wang Fei, his mistress, and his family.28  Wang Fei then filed a 
complaint letter to Tianya, requesting the website to take down online 
posts containing his personal information.  On March 23, 2008, 
almost three months after the initial publication of Wang Fei’s 
personal information, Tianya finally took down these content. 
The other forum was daqi.com (“Daqi”).  Originally known 
as ChinaBBS, Daqi was one of the earliest online forums on the 
Chinese Internet.  Daqi created their own news reports and comments 
about current events.  It also hosts a number of interactive features 
                                                                                                               
 21 Id.  Some of this information is still publicly available.  See Beijing Jiang Yan Wang 
Fei Dongfang Enna Zhaopian Boke MSN Kongjian (
MSN ) [Photos, Blogs and MSN Spaces of Jiang Yan, Wang Fei, and Dongfang Enna 
in Beijing] XINLANG LUNTAN ( ) (Jan. 15, 2008), http://club.history.sina.com.
cn/thread-2624045-1-1.html [https://perma.cc/2RTW-JKSB]. 
 22 Beijing Cong 24 Lou Tiaoxi Zisha de MM Zuihou de Riji ( 24
MM ) [The Last Dairy of a Girl Who Committed Suicide from the Twenty-Fourth 
Floor in Beijing], TIANYA ZATAN ( ) (Jan. 10, 2008), http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-free-
1094240-1.shtml [https://perma.cc/P97Z-4BTL]. 
 23 Downey, supra note 9. 
 24 Downey, supra note 9. 
 25 TIANYA ZATAN, supra note 22. 
 26 TIANYA ZATAN, supra note 22. 
 27 TIANYA ZATAN, supra note 22. 
 28 Chen Wanying, Will the First “Human Flesh Search” Trial Set Restrictions on the 
Practice?, EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH ( ) (July 31, 2008), 
http://zonaeuropa.com/20080802_1.htm [https://perma.cc/9PDT-UDMS] (summarizing the 
first “human flesh search” case regarding Wang Fei as a target of Internet users in China for 
alleged infidelity to his wife). 
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that allow Internet users to respond to the editors and commentators 
by posting their own thoughts and ideas.  Soon after the public 
discussion raised by Jiang Yang’s suicide, Daqi timely created a 
theme web page entitled “The last blog by a suicide girl who jumped 
from the 24th floor”.  The theme web page cited Wang Fei’s personal 
information as well as nefarious comments and provided a brief on 
Jiang Yan’s suicide, hyperlinks to related online content, a summary 
of online criticism, analysis by a psychology expert, and interviews 
with relevant individuals (Zhang Leyi, a classmate of her sister, and 
her lawyer).  As a result, many Internet users went to Daqi in order to 
criticize and threaten Wang Fei and his mistress. 
Wang Fei and his family were also harassed and threatened in 
the real world.  Not long after his cell phone number was published, 
Wang Fei received a high volume of offensive and threatening phone 
calls and text messages.  Some even included death threats.  Wang 
Fei had to move to his parents’ house to escape angry Internet users.  
Expletives were spray-painted on the doors of his parents’ house, 
including words like “whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood 
shall be shed” and “you killed a good wife.” 29   Strangers also 
contacted Wang Fei’s company, a multinational advertising agency, 
which later fired him and his mistress.  He was afraid to leave his 
house, and was not able to find a decent new job for almost two years.  
As Wang Fei himself put it, “the human flesh search engine 
completely ruined my personal life.”30 
In March 2008, Wang Fei brought lawsuits against Zhang 
Leyi, Tianya, and Daqi in Beijing Chaoyang District Court, which 
marked the most important case by far concerning the human flesh 
search engine in China.  The Beijing Chaoyang District Court made 
three decisions (one for each defendant) on December 18 of that same 
year. 
In the decision for Zhang Leyi, the Beijing Chaoyang District 
Court held that the defendant was liable for infringing on Wang Fei’s 
right to privacy and his right to reputation.  Beijing Chaoyang District 
Court found that through his website and blog, Zhang Leyi 
unlawfully publicized the affairs of Wang Fei and his mistress, as 
                                                                                                               
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
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well as Wang Fei’s personal information.31  According to the decision, 
privacy includes private life, private information, private space and 
personal seclusion.32  The Beijing Chaoyang District Court defined 
the right to privacy as a type of right of personality, which provides 
individuals control over their secrecy and their personal lives, and 
protects them from intervention by others.33  The Beijing Chaoyang 
District Court maintained that not only was personal identifiable 
information subject to privacy-related restrictions, but so too was the 
affair itself. 34   Therefore, it concluded that publicizing this 
information violated Wang Fei’s right to privacy as well as his right 
to reputation.  The legal basis for this decision was predicated mainly 
on article 101 of General Principles of the Civil Law, which provides 
protection to individuals’ personal dignity and reputation.35  Zhang 
Leyi was required to remove all infringing content on his website 
(including three blog articles and a photo of Wang Fei and his 
mistress), to make public apology on the front-page of his website, 
and to pay damages for emotional distress of RMB 5,000 to Wang 
Fei.36 
In the decision for the second defendant, Daqi, the Beijing 
Chaoyang District Court recognized the fact that soon after the public 
concern raised by Jiang Yang’s suicide, the website created the theme 
page of this incident, and allowed Internet users to comment on 
related topics on their BBS.37  The Beijing Chaoyang District Court 
held that in building the theme web page, conducting investigations 
and interviews, and cross-referencing other websites, Daqi expanded 
the event’s influence and helped distribute Wang Fei’s private 
                                                                                                               
 31 Wang Fei Su Zhang Leyi ( ) [Wang Fei v. Zhang Leyi], 2008 
CHAOMIN CHUZI 10930 (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. People’s Ct. Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.
chinacourt.org/article/detail/2008/12/id/337282.shtml [https://perma.cc/483S-T9UJ].  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Article 101 of General Principles of the Civil Law states that: “[C]itizens and legal 
persons shall enjoy the right of reputation.  The personality of citizens shall be protected by 
law, and the use of insults, libel or other means to damage the reputation of citizens or legal 
persons shall be prohibited.”  Minfa Tongze ( ) [General Principles of Civil Law] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 101. 
 36 Wang Fei Su Zhang Leyi, supra note 31. 
 37 Wang Fei Su Daqi Wang ( ) [Wang Fei v. Daqi.com], 2008 CHAOMIN 
CHUZI 29276 (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. People’s Ct. Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2008/12/id/337278.shtml [https://perma.cc/6VXC-
TSDZ]. 
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information among the general public.38  After the publication of the 
theme web page, many internet users continued to spread the 
information and criticized Wang Fei in Daqi on other online forums.39  
Later, these online criticisms turned to personal threats, bullying and 
stalking in the real world, which became so intensive and protracted 
that they seriously affected Wang Fei’s life and damaged his social 
reputation.40 
In its decision, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court invoked 
two administrative regulations that were stipulated to establish the 
liability of Internet service providers: the Regulation on Internet 
Information Service and Management Provisions on Electronic 
Bulletin Services in Internet.41  These regulations provide that the 
Internet service providers shall provide reliable services to Internet 
users and guarantee the legality of the content.42  Specifically, no one 
may publish information that might insult or slander or infringe upon 
the lawful rights of others in the electronic bulletin board service 
system.43  In cases where an Internet service provider finds such 
                                                                                                               
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.  In previous cases, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court has also held a website 
liable for publishing defamatory reports and articles.  See, e.g., Gao Xiaosong Su Yahu 
Xianggang Konggu Youxian Gongsi ( ) [Gao Xiaosong v. 
Yahoo! (Holdings) Hong Kong Ltd.], 2002 CHAOMIN CHUZI 04336 (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. 
People’s Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.cnipr.net/article_show.asp?article_id=8621 
[https://perma.cc/N5T2-YY9D]. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Article 13 of Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services 
provides that “[A]n Internet information services provider shall provide good quality 
services to Internet users and shall ensure the legality of the information provided by it.”  
Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa ( ) [Measures for the 
Administration of Internet Information Services] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 
25, 2000, effective Sept. 25, 2000), art. 13, translated in Administrative Measures on Internet 
Information Services, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-01/20/
content_19274704.htm [https://perma.cc/DJ87-3EZE]. 
 43 Article 15 section 8 of Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services provides that “[I]nternet information service providers may not produce, reproduce, 
disseminate or broadcast information with content that insults or slanders a third party or 
infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a third party.”  Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu 
Guanli Banfa, supra note 42.  Article 9 section 8 of the Management Provisions on Electronic 
Bulletin Services in Internet provides that “[N]o one may publish information in an 
electronic messaging service system with content that insults or slanders a third party or 
infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a third party.”  Hulianwang Dianzi Gonggao 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding ( ) [Management Provisions on 
Electronic Bulletin Services] (promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, Nov. 6, 2000, effective Nov. 6, 2000), art. 9. 
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information, the Internet service provider must delete it promptly, 
preserve related records and report them to relevant state 
authorities.44  Daqi did not fulfill its obligation as an Internet service 
provider in China. Therefore, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court 
held that Daqi violated Wang Fei’s right to privacy and his right to 
reputation.45  Daqi was required to remove the related theme web 
page, to make public apology on the front-page of its website, and to 
pay damages for emotional distress of RMB3,000 to Wang Fei.46 
Beijing Chaoyang District Court took a relatively balanced 
approach in the decision for Tianya.  It affirmed the facts that the 
Internet was developing rapidly in China, and that the number of 
Internet users had exceeded 200 million at the time of the Wang Fei 
case, thus surpassing traditional media to become the largest media 
outlet.47  The court also held that due to the diversity of Chinese 
characters and the continuous change in online language, it would be 
truly impossible for Chinese internet service providers to comb 
through all messages and monitor every online post before 
publication.48  Therefore, with respect to monitoring online posts, the 
liability for Internet service providers should be limited to their 
knowledge of the legality of the content.  Internet service providers 
that knowingly allow the existence and spread of illegal or infringing 
information shall be held accountable under contributory 
infringement. 49   Internet service providers shall not be held 
accountable if they take down illegal content in a timely manner.50  
                                                                                                               
 44 Article 16 of Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services 
provides that “[I]f an Internet information service provider discovers that information 
transmitted by its website clearly falls within the contents listed in Article 15 hereof, it shall 
immediately discontinue the transmission of such information, keep relevant records and 
make a report to relevant State authorities.”  Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa, supra 
note 42.  Article 13 of the Management Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet 
provides that “[I]f an electronic messaging service provider discovers that information 
transmitted by its service system clearly falls within the contents listed in Article 9 hereof, 
it shall immediately delete such information, keep relevant records and make a report to 
relevant State authorities.”  Hulianwang Dianzi Gonggao Fuwu Guanli Guiding, supra note 
43, art. 13. 
 45 Wang Fei Su Daqi Wang, supra note 37. 
 46 Wang Fei Su Daqi Wang, supra note 37. 
 47 Wang Fei Su Tianya ( ) [Wang Fei v. Tianya], 2008 CHAOMIN CHUZI 
29277 (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. People’s Ct. Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.chinacourt.org/
article/detail/2008/12/id/337281.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y43E-TTFZ] (last visited May 24, 
2016). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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In this case, Tianya took down, in due course, the alleged infringing 
information after receiving complaints from Wang Fei. 51   Thus, 
Beijing Chaoyang District Court held that Tianya was not liable.52 
In sum, based on article 15 section 8 of the Regulation on 
Internet Information Service,53 article 9 section 8 of the Management 
Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet,54 and article 
101 of General Principles of the Civil Law,55 Zhang Leyi and Daqi 
were held liable for infringing Wang Fei’s right to privacy and the 
right to reputation.  Tianya, on the other hand, had fulfilled its notice-
take-down obligation, and thus was not held liable.  Zhang Leyi 
appealed the decision in early 2009 and the upper level court, the 
Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court, affirmed the decision on December 
23, 2009.56 
III. BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH 
The human flesh search engine expands the significance of 
the tension between privacy and free speech, and brings to light new 
perspectives on the balance between them.57  By focusing on U.S. 
constitutional analysis, this section will open up the discussion about 
balancing privacy and free speech in the digital age. 
The First Amendment, on its face, prohibits any effort of the 
government to abridge “the freedom of speech, or of the press.”58  
However, as Justice Holmes’ famous aphorism about the right to 
shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater when there is no fire, the First 
                                                                                                               
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa, supra note 42. 
 54 Hulianwang Dianzi Gonggao Fuwu Guanli Guiding, supra note 43. 
 55 Article 101 of General Principles of the Civil Law provides that “citizens and legal 
persons shall enjoy the right of reputation.  The personality of citizens shall be 
protected by law, and the use of insults, libel or other means to damage the reputation of 
citizens or legal persons shall be prohibited.”  Minfa Tongze, supra note 35, art. 101. 
 56 Wang Fei Su Zhang Leyi ( ) [Wang Fei v. Zhang Leyi], 2009 
ERZHONGMIN ZHONGZI 5603 (Beijing No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 23, 2009), 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/payz_117802834.html [https://perma.cc/7GBZ-F3HK]. 
 57 Although physical violence associated with the human flesh search engine is conduct 
rather than speech, the creation and dissemination of personal information on the Internet 
can be considered as speech for the First Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (regulating disclosures on the internet is considered a 
regulation of speech). 
 58 This view was famously held by Justice Hugo Black, who asserted that “no law” 
means no law.  See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61–63 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (stating “the commands of the First Amendment are stated in unqualified terms”). 
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Amendment right is not absolute.59  When in conflict with other 
interests such as the right to privacy, restrictions on speech 
historically have been considered justifiable.  Thus, the human flesh 
search engine poses an instance that requires careful analysis of the 
balance between privacy and free speech.60 
According to Alexander Meiklejohn, the key purpose of 
speech protection is to preserve the open debate that is necessary for 
the health of democracy.61  In light of this, the First Amendment is 
most concerned with political speech because of its importance to 
democratic deliberation and self-government.  Indeed, compared to 
other kinds of speech,62 the U.S. Supreme Court has set the highest 
threshold for restrictions on political speech.63  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s protection of speech for private individuals and of 
private concern is comparatively not as stringent.  Most of the online 
speech in the Wang Fei case is speech about private individuals and 
of private concern.  The question then is: do restrictions on this kind 
of speech violate the First Amendment? 
To answer this question, we might first turn to the analytical 
framework that the U.S. Supreme Court has used in relevant First 
Amendment cases.  The first step of the analysis is to decide whether 
the challenged law is content-based or content-neutral. 64   If the 
                                                                                                               
 59 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 60 See Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. 
J. 943, 945 (1987) (explaining more about balancing values on constitutional questions). 
 61 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, 
IN POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 3 (1960) (originally 
published 1948). 
 62 Traditionally, the First Amendment imposes tight constraints upon government 
efforts to restrict political speech, while imposing looser constraints when the government 
seeks to restrict commercial speech.  See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 563 (1980) (stating the Constitution provides lesser 
protection to commercial speech). 
 63 These higher standards relied on the “profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 
(1949) (stating that the vitality of civil and political institutions depends on free discussion); 
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (concluding that free political discussion is 
imperative in part because it ensures the government is more responsive to the “will of the 
people” and promotes change through peaceful means); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375–
76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the Founders believed freedom of speech 
was indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth). 
 64 “As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from 
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.” Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). 
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challenged law is found to be content-neutral, the Court generally 
applies “intermediate scrutiny” and balances relative social costs and 
benefits. 65   If the challenged law is content-based, it is 
“presumptively invalid” and the Court will apply strict scrutiny.66  
Insofar as the government forbids communicating private 
information about other persons, the restriction is clearly directed at 
the content of the communication.  Therefore, the content-neutral 
analysis is almost irrelevant to the analysis of the human flesh search 
engine. 
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court would have needed to 
apply strict scrutiny to decide whether content-based restrictions on 
free speech in the Wang Fei case could have been permitted. 67  
Content-based speech restrictions are generally unconstitutional 
unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest—the 
two-prong test that the U.S. Supreme Court usually applies. 68  
Historically, content-based restrictions on free speech have been 
permitted for incitement, obscenity,69 defamation,70 speech integral 
to criminal conduct,71 fighting words,72 child pornography,73 fraud,74 
                                                                                                               
 65 See, e.g., Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 723, 724 (2000) (holding that when a content-
neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy 
the standard of scrutiny even though it is not the least restrictive means of serving the 
statute’s goal). 
 66 See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“[A] content-
based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994). 
 69 See, e.g., Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene material is 
unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 70 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (concluding that 
notwithstanding the First Amendment, States should retain substantial latitude to enforce 
legal remedies for defamatory falsehoods). 
 71 See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 496 (1949) (holding 
that Missouri statute prohibiting collusive agreements in restraint of trade do not violate 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech). 
 72 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that “fighting words” 
are not in any proper sense communication of information or opinions safeguarded by the 
Constitution). 
 73 See, e.g., New York. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that child 
pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection). 
 74 See, e.g., Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (stating that “untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has 
never been protected for its own sake”). 
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true threats, 75  and speech presenting some grave and imminent 
threats.76  According to these precedents, true threats and fighting 
words in the Wang Fei case, both on and off the Internet, deserve no 
First Amendment protection.  But what about the aggregation and 
publication of Wang Fei’s personal identifiable information (such as 
his cellphone number, home address, photos, and national identity 
number) on the Internet?  In other words, could restrictions on speech 
about private individuals, if narrowly tailored, satisfy the compelling 
interest prong of First Amendment strict scrutiny?  This Note argues 
that certain restrictions on this type of speech are justifiable in the 
Internet age. 
A. Privacy in the Digital Age 
As if past social and technological changes were not enough 
to cause concern to the right to privacy, almost a century after the 
publication of Warren and Brandies’ article77 the Internet arrived. 
The advances of the Internet and related technologies, such as Big 
Data and the Cloud, have caused a larger disruption than any previous 
technology and they have specifically sparked debate around 
information privacy.78 
So how has this disturbance manifested?  First, many 
fragments of personal information collected by new technologies, 
saved in databases and scattered across the Internet.  Once digitized, 
it is difficult to control their circulation and dissemination on the 
Internet.  Even those who have never used the Internet are likely to 
have some personal information online.79  As Yochai Benkler notes, 
                                                                                                               
 75 See, e.g., Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (holding the U.S. has a valid 
interest in protecting the President’s safety and may prohibit threats against the President 
where the government proves they were “true” threats). 
 76 See, e.g., Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931) (holding that a publication that 
maliciously defames and bullies people was considered a public nuisance). 
 77 See generally Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, (1890).  It is also worth noting that Brandeis also wrote some of the greatest prose 
for free speech, such as his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 
(1927). 
 78 For example, photography, audio, and video recording technologies did bring 
concerns over the control of personal information, but not as much as Internet technology. 
 79 A homeless beggar in the city of Ningbo, Brother Sharp, was a target of human flesh 
search engine after an amateur photographer posted pictures of him walking the streets onto 
the Chinese Internet.  Clifford Coonan, Handsome Chinese Vagrant Draws Fans of 
‘Homeless Chic’, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/handsome-chinese-vagrant-draws-fans-of-homeless-chic-1915812.html 
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many of the problems spawned by the Internet are due to the 
“destabilization” of traditional information flows in everyday life.80  
The power of controlling personal information has been continually 
transferred from individuals to Internet intermediaries.  The 
underlying assumption of previous privacy-related legal doctrines is 
that individuals who are concerned about their personal information 
will undertake reasonable, though imperfect, actions to protect their 
privacy by controlling how, when, where, and to whom they reveal 
their personal information.  This assumption has been challenged by 
these new Internet technologies, and legal doctrines that rely on it 
should be adjusted accordingly.                                           
Second, personal information that used to be “scattered, 
perishable and localized is becoming searchable, permanent and 
widespread”. 81   Companies, particularly Internet intermediaries, 
archive digitalized personal information and ensure the longevity of 
such information, which stand to follow individuals in perpetuity.  
Moreover, Google and other search engines provide efficient ways to 
locate personal information of individuals.  For example, in the past, 
Wang Fei’s personal information would have been gradually 
forgotten, and he might at least have an option to move to a new place 
and start a new life.  This is impossible in the digital age today.  Not 
only can the Internet and other technologies allow people to obtain 
his personal information to see, but they can also continue to make 
his personal information almost permanently available online.  
Indeed, these technological developments have underscored the 
concerns about the balance between privacy and free speech. 
B. Speech: Moving from the Offline World to the Online World 
Previous doctrines of free speech are being challenged by the 
development of the Internet and related technologies.82  First, the 
                                                                                                               
[https://perma.cc/K8QP-2QHC].  The case of Andrew Fledmar described by Mayer-
Schönberger presents similar concerns.  See VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE 
VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3–5 (2009). 
 80 Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation, Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1203, 1238–40 (2000). 
 81 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET 4 (2007). 
 82 For discussion about the First Amendment issues in the early days of Internet age, 
see generally Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613 (1995); Cass 
R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995); Lawrence 
Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995). 
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Internet is a public forum that allows numerous Internet users to 
function as a crowd, which acts in unison to criticize one or more 
individuals.  Over a century ago, Gustave Le Bon suggested that 
individuals in a crowd assimilate easily, develop a herd mentality, 
and lose their individual personalities. 83   This is the social 
phenomenon we witness in the human flesh search engine, where 
individuals falsify their own knowledge, or at least suppress their own 
doubts, in the face of the apparent views of a crowd.  Most public 
humiliation and defamation speech in the human flesh search engine 
reflect Internet users’ strong opinions and little actual or first-hand 
knowledge regarding the given debate.  As the volubility of opinion 
grows, so too do the number of Internet users who subscribe to that 
opinion, irrespective of whether it is actually true in a factual sense.  
Internet-based group-thinking of this sort exacerbates unjustified 
critique, creates and propagates falsehoods, and potentially damages 
the reputation of individuals. 
Secondly, as Cass Sunstein rightly points out, through social 
cascades and group polarization, online speech is very likely to “go 
extreme.”84  And extreme deliberation makes the crowd far more 
likely to support aggressive protest actions.  In the Wang Fei case, 
public humiliation and defamation speech pervaded the human flesh 
search engine, creating a hostile environment that discouraged 
reasonable conversation.  At that time, no one cared about the facts 
that Wang Fei and his wife were separated, and that Wang Fei’s wife 
had suffered mental illness for quite a long time.  Furthermore, when 
the public humiliation reached a tipping point, some Internet users 
eventually took aggressive actions to intervene in Wang Fei’s life. 
Thirdly, Internet users can easily exploit the anonymity of the 
Internet to target helpless victims with vile speech that invades 
privacy, ruins reputations, or spreads prejudice.  As Daniel Solove 
points out, “when people are less accountable for their conduct, they 
are more likely to engage in unsavory acts.”85  With the speakers 
being anonymous, online speech is “often much nastier and more 
                                                                                                               
 83 GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 7–43 (1896). 
 84 CASS R SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 1–5, 
21–37 (2009).  Social cascade occurs when a group of early movers say or do something and 
other people follow their signal because individuals tend to rely on what other people think 
and do.  Group polarization refers to the fact that when likeminded people get together, they 
often end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to 
talk to one another. 
 85 Solove, supra note 81, at 140. 
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uncivil,” and “it is easier to say harmful things about others when we 
don’t have to take responsibility.” 86   Moreover, Yochai Benkler 
argues that the Internet eliminated the intermediaries that were 
gatekeepers to control the dissemination of, and access to, speech.87  
With the Internet, almost anything that anyone was willing to put 
online was available directly to anyone else.88  Last but not least, 
without personal experience, it is particularly difficult to become 
well-informed about a person through the Internet.  Individuals will 
be “judged, fairly or unfairly, on the basis of isolated bits of personal 
information that are taken out of context.”89  Therefore, a single 
negative revelation or fabrication proliferated online could ruin one’s 
reputation beyond the possibility of redress.90  In the Wang Fei case, 
the Internet will always remember Wang Fei as a terrible husband 
whose adultery caused his wife to commit suicide.  Indeed, in many 
cases of the human flesh search engine, these perceptions might well 
become a constituent part of the victims’ identity, where they have to 
bear these stigmas for the rest of their lives. 
Because of these characteristics of online speech, the 
Brandenburg test that U.S. Supreme Court heavily relied on in the 
past few decades—whether the speech is “directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is not likely to incite or 
produce such action”91—should be reconsidered in the Internet age.  
The author contends that because of the increased danger of online 
speech towards private individuals, the Brandenburg test is no longer 
adequate for the analysis. 
In Cohen v. California, while judging a man for wearing a 
jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” inside the Los Angeles 
Courthouse, the Court overturned his conviction for disturbing the 
peace.92  In that case, the Court did not believe that “substantial 
numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at 
                                                                                                               
 86 Id. 
 87 Benkler, supra note 80, at 1203. 
 88 Id. 
 89 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 
200 (2000). 
 90 SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, 
AND REPUTATION 1–3 (2010). 
 91 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 92 Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that 
uttered by Cohen.”93 
But the Wang Fei case is different.  Posting personal 
information online is not delivering a handbill or a pamphlet in a 
courthouse.  A significant number of Internet users were incited by 
the online speech to take lawless actions with enduring effect on 
Wang Fei and his family.  In United States v. Dinwiddie, Judge 
Arnold explained that the alleged threat must be analyzed in light of 
its entire factual context to determine whether the recipient of the 
alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a 
determination or intent to injure presently or in the future.94  In the 
Wang Fei case, Internet users not only posted vicious statements—
such as “whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood shall be shed” 
and “you killed a good wife”— but also spray-printed them on the 
door of Wang Fei’s home using the information provided by the 
human flesh search engine.  In this context, a reasonable person 
would foresee that a combination of those vicious statements and the 
publication of Wang Fei’s personal information “would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement 
as a serious expression of intent to harm and assault.”95  Both the 
Internet users and Internet intermediaries understood the purpose of 
distributing Wang Fei’s personal information: to expose him to public 
humiliation and harassment.  Therefore, such online speech should be 
assigned less weight when balanced against privacy protections. 
C. Speech about Private Individuals and of Private Concern 
vis-a-vis Speech about Public Officials and of Public Concern 
Here, the distinction between private individuals and public 
officials, and between public and private concern, are crucial for a 
more nuanced understanding of online speech protection.  When 
regulating distressing or outrageous speech, the U.S. Supreme Court 
looks at whether speech is of private or public concern to determine 
                                                                                                               
 93 Id. at 23. 
 94 U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 95 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the posters constituted a true threat.  The court reasoned that in three 
prior incidents, a “wanted”-type poster identifying a specific doctor who provided abortion 
services was circulated, and the doctor named on the poster was killed.  The activists and 
physicians knew of this, and both understood the significance of the particular posters 
specifically identifying each of them). 
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the appropriate level of First Amendment protection.96  As Justice 
Roberts points out in Snyder v. Phelps, “not all speech is of equal 
First Amendment importance, however, and where matters of purely 
private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are 
often less rigorous.”97 
Moreover, as Daniel Solove argues, under theories that 
support free speech—democratic self-governance, the market-place 
of ideas, and individual autonomy 98 —speech about private 
individuals and of private concern “does not strongly further the 
interests justifying free speech.”99 
Finally, the Internet has occasioned the proliferation of online 
speech about the private concern of private individuals. This type of 
speech is potentially much more harmful to information privacy than 
other types of online speech.  The vast majority of online speech has 
little to do with issues of public concern, but it has a lot to do with 
private concerns of individuals’ lives.100  Therefore, restrictions on 
such speech might well be more justifiable.101 
The distinctions between private individuals and public 
officials and between public and private concern are not novel in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s prior decisions.  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the 
Court held, by a vote of 6-3, that the government could not 
constitutionally punish the media for broadcasting an unlawfully 
wiretapped telephone conversation where the information was related 
to both public officials and public concern.102 
                                                                                                               
 96 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985). 
 97 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). 
 98 However, affirmative claims of free speech cannot be easily dismissed.  These are 
the three most important theories for free speech, all of which require refinement for their 
applications in the Internet age. 
 99 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 986–1000 (2003).  For the three theories addressing the 
scope of First Amendment speech protection, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–1009 (1978) (describing these 
methods and concluding constitutional protection of speech is justified because freedom of 
speech is for nonviolent and “noncoercive” speech). 
 100 Jack M. Balkin, DIGITAL SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: A THEORY OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004). 
 101 Solove, supra note 99, at 967, 975 (2003) (“[S]peech of private concern is less 
valuable than speech of public concern and should be assigned less weight.”). 
 102 The Bartnicki Court held that intermediaries cannot be sanctioned for publishing 
information of public concerns though it was illegally obtained. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 
U.S. 514, 528 (2001).  The First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  “[S]peech on ‘matters of public 
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However, the Court left open the question of whether the 
government could punish commentators or intermediaries if the 
broadcast had involved only matters related to private individuals and 
private concern.  Traditionally, speech about public officials, as well 
as celebrities,103 is protected by the First Amendment unless ‘actual 
malice’ is shown.104  By contrast, speech about private individuals is 
less strongly protected by the Court,105 because “there is no threat to 
the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential 
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas,” and the “threat of 
liability” does not pose the risk of “a reaction of self-censorship” on 
matters of public import.106 
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern 
requires us to examine the “content, form, and context” of that 
speech. 107   In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court wrote: “While these 
messages may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the 
issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United 
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the 
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of 
public import.”108  Borrowing the Court’s logic, some might argue 
that the online commentaries on Wang Fei’s adulterous behavior 
constitute speech of public concern.  Such online critiques certainly 
convey Internet users’ positions on this issue, in a manner designed, 
unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a 
public audience as possible via the Internet. 
                                                                                                               
concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–759 (1985) (opinion of Justice Powell) 
(quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 103 See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fallwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 104 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 280 (1964). 
 105 The Republicanism argument on free speech protection focuses primarily on the 
virtue of democratic deliberation and this mostly refers to speech about public officials and 
of public concern rather than speech of private individuals and of private concern.  For 
instance, in Stromberg v. California, the Court held that “the maintenance of the opportunity 
for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the 
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”  Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).  See also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 61, at 3. 
 106 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760.  See also 
Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Group, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009) (stating that under 
Georgia law, to properly balance freedom of the press against the right of privacy, every 
private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication must have some 
substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest). 
 107 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 444. 
 108 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454. 
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However, there are several reasons that support the private-
concern aspect of such speech and the protection of privacy in the 
Wang Fei case.  First of all, online critiques against adultery do not 
necessarily require knowledge of Wang Fei’s personal information, 
such as his cellphone number, home address, or national identity 
number, which were generated through the human flesh search engine.  
Even if some of his personal information—for instance, his 
relationship with his mistress—could be viewed as contributing to a 
discussion on a matter of public concern, that would not change the 
fact that the dominant theme of the human flesh search engine alluded 
to personal information that had little to do with public concern.  
Second, the context of the Wang Fei case has shown an intent to 
disturb, harass, and threaten, even if the speech occurred through a 
public forum—the Internet.  The fact that Internet users spoke in 
those BBS cannot by itself transform the nature of their speech.109  
Finally, some of the online critiques captured in the Wang Fei case—
such as “F*** your mother”, “D*** your family” and “You are the 
murder[er]”—can be considered true threats because they are 
invitations of hostility, and “like Ryder trucks or burning crosses, 
they connote something they do not literally say, yet both the actor 
and the recipient get the message.” 110   Although some offensive 
speech is protected by the First Amendment, it does not protect true 
threats. 111   Such speech, which relates to cyberstalking, 112 
cyberharassment, and cyberbullying, focuses on intimidating, 
distressing and threatening Wang Fei and his family; it has very little 
to do with the original policy goals of First Amendment’s speech 
                                                                                                               
 109 In a concurring opinion in Times v. Hill, Justice Douglas held that when individuals 
are then in the public domain, such privacy as a person has ceased.  This standard could 
hardly be applied in the Internet age, for one can very easily enter in the public domain (for 
example, in public discussion of online forums) even he is involuntary. See Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglass, J., concurring). 
 110 Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 111 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 112 In the United States, courts often invoke the cyberstalking statute (18 U.S.C. § 
2261A(2) (2006)) to regulate cyberstalking.  See, e.g., United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 
365, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant liable for disturbing emails and 
letters, making phone calls to his victim over the course of about a year, and following his 
victim to West Virginia and engaged in vaguely threatening behavior.); United States v. 
Shrader, No. 1:09-CR-00270, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10820, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 8, 2010) 
(holding the defendant liable for calling his ex-girlfriend daily for about two months and 
sending her a thirty-two-page letter saying she had two weeks to decide what to do before 
he initiated his next step). 
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protection, i.e. democratic self-governance, the market-place of ideas, 
and individual autonomy.  Therefore, restrictions on such speech in 
the Wang Fei case are justifiable and desirable. 
In sum, the harms from the human flesh search engine 
targeting private individuals are extremely serious, and preventing 
these harms and protecting privacy could be a compelling interest.  
As a result, restrictions on online speech about private individuals and 
of private concern, if narrowly tailored, can satisfy the compelling 
interest prong of strict scrutiny, and therefore are constitutional in the 
U.S. context.113  When balancing free speech and privacy, speech 
about private individuals and of private concern deserves relatively 
less protection, and privacy should be assigned more weight in such 
cases.  The following section discusses how victims of the human 
flesh search engine can seek remedies for privacy infringement in 
American law. 
IV. REPERCUSSIONS AND REMEDIES IN AMERICAN LAW 
A. Various Repercussions Against Victims in the Human Flesh 
Search Engine 
Victims in the human flesh search engine could potentially 
suffer at least three types of repercussions: reputational damage, 
economic loss and physical violence. 
Firstly, the disclosure of personal information in the human 
flesh search engine can readily lead to damage of one’s reputation.  
The gravity of social stigma depends upon the strength and 
pervasiveness of the mobilized hostility,114 which is rooted in the 
                                                                                                               
 113 Many states either have enacted laws against offensive online speech or established 
task forces to create such laws.  See Harry A. Valetk, Cyberstalking: Navigating a Maze of 
Laws, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 2002, at 5.  Admittedly, the “narrowly tailored” prong does raise 
concerns about restrictions of online speech.  For instance, Utah’s recent proposed anti-
doxing bill was considered to be too over-board to pass the First Amendment scrutiny.  See 
Eugene Volokh, Utah ‘Anti-Doxxing’ Bill Would Outlaw Mentioning a Person’s Name 
Online ‘With Intent to Offend’, WA. POST (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/08/utah-anti-doxxing-bill-would-outlaw-mentioning-
a-persons-name-online-with-intent-to-offend/ [https://perma.cc/P5RL-GWEQ] (stating the 
opinion that being unable to call someone “foolish” would be too restricting on the First 
Amendment).  If the proposed law is too broad, it could hardly pass the First Amendment; if 
too narrow, it would not provide sufficient relief for a victim of online offensive speech. 
 114 Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy 
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 51–52, (discussing the social 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/5
294 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 12 
social and moral tolerance of a given time and context.  Moreover, 
the disclosure of personal information in the human flesh search 
engine almost certainly leads to cyber harassment.  In addition to 
endless disruptive telephone calls, the Internet makes it easier for 
people to engage in malicious accusations, defamation, slander, and 
libel.  All these kinds of reputational harms can be found in the Wang 
Fei case.115 
Second, the human flesh search engine can also inflict serious 
damage on the target’s ability to gain or maintain employment, 
thereby causing economic harm to them.  In the Wang Fei case, the 
human flesh search engine resulted in Wang Fei losing his job, and 
foreclosed future employment for an extended period of time. 
Last but not least, disclosure of personal information about 
targets with socially and morally unacceptable behaviors leads to 
physical violence.  The personal information disclosed in the human 
flesh search engine about targets serves as a tacit invitation of 
hostility to those Internet users, who, being already engaged in the 
human flesh search engine, have the potential to ‘go extreme.’  This 
is what happened in the Wang Fei case.116 
B. Torts Remedies in American Law 
Victims of the human flesh search engine can seek torts 
remedies for the repercussions, which involve three distinct privacy 
torts under American law: public disclosure of private facts, 117 
                                                                                                               
sanctions against communists in the McCarthy era, which was triggered by public disclosure 
of private facts). 
 115 See supra Part II (describing the Wang Fei case in detail). 
 116 See supra Part II (describing the Wang Fei case in detail).  Similarly, the exposure to 
parents and husbands of the identity of women seeking abortion can result in unwanted and 
unwarranted action of violence, threats, and harassment. See Planned Parenthood v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063–66 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 117 Past cases in American law have established that “lack of newsworthiness is an 
element of the ‘private facts’ tort, making newsworthiness a complete bar to common law 
liability” for the tort of public disclosure of private facts.  Shulman v. Group W Productions, 
Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (1998).  In the Wang Fei case, although the incident of suicide itself 
is clearly newsworthy, Wang Fei’s personal information, such as his cellphone number, 
home address and national identity number, is not.  The primary reason for this is that the 
connection between the activities that brought Wang Fei into the public eye and the particular 
personal information that was disclosed is too weak.  Thus, the publication of such personal 
information may well constitute the common law tort of public disclosure of private facts. 
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intrusion upon seclusion, 118  and false light. 119 , 120   The more 
challenging questions is: who should be liable for privacy torts? 
If the common law tort liability were established, Wang Fei is 
entitled to seek judicial remedies against three defendants, each of 
whom represents a distinct type of stakeholder of the human flesh 
search engine.  The first defendant, Zhang Leyi, is merely a private 
blog owner on the Internet.  But unlike conventional media channels, 
through reposting and hyperlinking, the size of the audience of his 
publication is significantly increased by the Internet.121  Zhang Leyi 
is the owner of his personal blog website (orionchris.cn), on which 
he posted stories about Jiang Yan and Wang Fei.  These blogs also 
included personal information about Wang Fei and defamatory 
statements against him and his mistress.  His personal website can be 
regarded as an Internet content provider and he is one of the most 
notable participant of the human flesh search engine against Wang 
Fei.  Such direct infringement could hardly escape liability. 
The second defendant, Tianya, was the most popular Chinese 
BBS, almost all content of which is generated by the website’s 
millions of registered users.  Internet users are allowed to 
communicate publicly by posting messages on Tianya’s BBS, where 
                                                                                                               
 118 Under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, liability may be imposed for an intrusion 
into a “private place, conversation, or matter . . . in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”  Id. at 230.  In the Wang Fei case, some Internet users had intruded into private 
matters by obtaining private information from non-public sources (e.g. Wang Fei’s private 
photos).  Furthermore, telephone harassment and physical intrusion into Wang Fei’s home 
might well constitute the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. 
 119 In common law torts, one who publicizes a matter concerning another that places that 
person before the public in a false light is subject to liability to that person for invasion of 
his privacy.  Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 991–92 (Ill. 1989).  
As previously discussed, through social cascades and group polarization, online speech in 
the human flesh search engine can be very polarizing and highly offensive to the target.  In 
the present case, building on the fact that Wang Fei committed adultery, some Internet users, 
as well as Daqi, portrayed Wang Fei in a false light in order to depict him as a guilty, indecent, 
and disgraceful man in every aspect of his life.  Thus, the common law tort of false light 
might well sustain in cases involving the human flesh search engine. 
 120 William Prosser identified four distinct privacy torts that had developed through the 
300 cases based on the Warren and Brandeis article.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. 
L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960).  The privacy torts are (1) public disclosure of private facts, (2) 
intrusion upon seclusion, (3) false light, and (4) appropriation.  For recent discussion and 
cases about privacy torts, see generally ANITA ALLEN, PRIVACY AND SOCIETY ch. 1 (2d ed. 
2011) (describing current privacy tort cases). 
 121 For more discussion about information distribution of individual Internet users, see 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 
46–50 (2008); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1-7 (2006). 
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content can be read by any Internet users.  Internet users conducted 
the human flesh search engine and posted commentaries on Tianya.  
Should Tianya be liable for the illegality of the human flesh search 
engine in American jurisprudence? 
To answer this question, we must first examine liability of 
Internet intermediaries under the U.S. law.  In order to promote 
competition in the telecommunication industry and to prevent 
indecent material from transmitting via computers and phone lines, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Telecommunication Act of 1996.122  
Title V of the Telecommunication Act was codified as the 
Communication Decency Act.  Section 230(c)(1) of the 
Communications Decency Act provides, “no provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”123  Section 230 immunity is the most important safe harbor 
for intermediary liability of interactive computer service providers.124 
Since the promulgation of Section 230, litigation has 
promptly followed this liability vacuum for offensive online speech.  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the 
liability of Internet service providers, lower courts have, in a number 
of cases, upheld this provision and given relatively broad 
interpretation of this immunity.125 
The seminal decision in the United States is Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc. (“AOL”).126  There, an unidentified third party posted 
messages on AOL, advertising t-shirts with tasteless slogans related 
to the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, as well as 
Zeran’s phone number.  This resulted in Zeran being inundated with 
                                                                                                               
 122 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 123 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998). 
 124 Jack Balkin argues that section 230 
[H]as had enormous consequences for securing the vibrant culture of 
freedom of expression we have on the Internet today . . . .Section 230 is 
by no means a perfect piece of legislation; it may be overprotective in 
some respects and underprotective in others. But it has been valuable 
nevertheless. 
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 434 
(2009). 
 125 See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–35 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 42–58 (2006); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419–22 (1st Cir. 2007); Directory Assistants, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC 
et. al., 884 F. Supp. 2d 446 (2012).  
 126 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–35 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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death threats and other violent calls and text messages.  Zeran brought 
an action against AOL, arguing that AOL unreasonably delayed in 
removing defamatory messages.  Zeran contended that “once he 
notified AOL of the unidentified third party’s hoax, AOL had a duty 
to remove the defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers 
of the message’s false nature, and to effectively screen future 
defamatory material.” 127   The Zeran Court held that Section 230 
immunized interactive computer service providers from claims based 
on information posted by a third party.128 
The Zeran Court provided two main reasons.  First, the Zeran 
Court recognized that interactive computer services have millions of 
users and that the amount of information communicated via 
interactive computer services is “staggering.” 129   It would be 
impossible for service providers to screen millions of postings for 
potential tort liability.130  The Zeran Court refused to apply notice-
based liability for the concern that Internet service providers would 
face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially 
defamatory statement—from any party, concerning any message.131 
Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of 
the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal 
judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an 
on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the 
continued publication of that information.132  In light of the vast 
amount of speech communicated through interactive computer 
services, these notices could produce an impossible burden for 
service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of 
suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.133  
                                                                                                               
 127 Id. at 330. 
 128 Id.  Zeran made another, though ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to seek remedy 
from a classic-rock radio broadcaster, which redistributed the defamatory content.  See Zeran 
v. Diamond Broad, Inc., 203 F.3d 714, 718–22 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing the appeal). 
 129 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
850). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 333.  Notably, subsequent cases viewed Zeran as the foundation of a principle 
establishing absolute immunity for Internet service providers under section 230 and refused 
to apply notice-based liability by repeatedly emphasizing the undue burden that would be 
created by the application of notice-based liability.  See, e.g., Doe v. America Online, Inc. 
783 So.2d 1010, 1013–1017 (Fla. 2001); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 108 Wash.App. 454, 
31 P.3d 37 (2001); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s Inc. 163 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071–1072 
(D.S.D.2001); Blumenthal v. Drudge 992 F.Supp. 44, 49–52 (D.D.C.1998). 
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Moreover, potential liability for each message republished by their 
services might create chilling effects, that is: Internet service 
providers “might choose to severely restrict the number and type of 
messages posted”.134 
According to Zeran, interactive computer service providers 
can enjoy Section 230 immunity under the U.S. law.  Could Tianya 
and Daqi be categorized as interactive computer service providers?  
Section 230 defines “interactive computer service” as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions.”135  In analyzing the availability 
of the immunity offered by Section 230, U.S. courts generally apply 
a three-prong test: (1) the defendant must be a provider or user of an 
“interactive computer service,” (2) the asserted claims must treat the 
defendant as a publisher or speaker of the harmful information at 
issue, and (3) the information must be provided by other “information 
content provider.”136 
In this case, Tianya is the provider of BBS service (interactive 
computer service), on which some Internet users (publishers or 
speakers) spread harmful information about Wang Fei.  Tianya, 
therefore, satisfied all three prongs of the test, thus can be regarded 
as an interactive computer service provider under Section 230.  
Consequently, Section 230 would immunize Tianya from liability for 
information that originates with other users of the human flesh search 
engine. 
The last defendant, Daqi, is a commercial online news agency 
that functions as a traditional printing press.  Daqi published a news 
column about the incident, in which it not only compiled and reposted 
other news sources, but also generated its own content, such as an 
interview with Jiang Hong (Jiang Yan’s sister) and Zhang Leyi, a 
summary of online criticism, an interview with a psychologist, etc.  
Therefore, Daqi is not only an Internet service provider but also an 
information content provider, which directly posted content that 
infringes Wang Fei’s privacy. 
                                                                                                               
 134 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 135 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (1998). 
 136 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] ONLINE PRIVACY AND ONLINE SPEECH 299 
According to Section 230, an information content provider is: 
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the Internet 
or any other interactive computer service.”137  Section 230 immunity 
extends only when the content is not provided by the service entity, 
and Internet content providers do not enjoy Section 230 immunity.138  
In the Wang Fei case, Daqi exercised its editorial discretion and made 
substantial contribution to the content at issue, making it an Internet 
content provider.  Therefore, Daqi cannot claim immunity for content 
it created and distributed under Section 230.  In short, under 
American jurisprudence, Daqi would also be held liable for infringing 
on Wang Fei’s right to privacy.139 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING THE HUMAN 
FLESH SEARCH ENGINE 
The goal of this Note is not only to argue that the value of 
privacy trumps the value of free speech when online speech in the 
human flesh search engine is about private individuals and of private 
concerns, but also to examine possible remedies for the victims of the 
human flesh search engine.  Based on previous analysis in American 
jurisprudence, this section examines policy implications for Chinese 
policymakers. 
The first question is who should be liable for the human flesh 
search engine?  A victim of the human flesh search engine generally 
has two options.140  The first option is to pursue legal remedy against 
those Internet users who, as a matter of positive law, are directly 
                                                                                                               
 137 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1998). 
 138 An information content provider has no immunity under Section 230. See, e.g., Fair 
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 926 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that by creating and developing a discriminatory questionnaire, 
Roommates.com made itself an information content provider with no immunity under 
section 230). 
 139 As Justice Harlan rightly pointed out in Time v. Hill, “[o]ther professional activity of 
great social value is carried on under a duty of reasonable care, and there is no reason to 
suspect the press would be less hardy than medical practitioners or attorneys, for example.” 
Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 410 (1967).  Because of the wide coverage and the interactivity, 
a higher standard of professional responsibility should be applied to online news agencies 
than traditional press outlets in order to properly prevent potential harm to private individuals. 
 140 Some victims of the human flesh search engine chose to remain silent because 
seeking remedies publicly might bring more public attention, thus risking further exposure 
and harassment. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/5
300 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 12 
responsible for online tortious infringement.  But this lacks any 
meaningful chance of success for two reasons.  First, when engineers 
designed what became the Internet, they chose not to incorporate an 
identification layer into the entire network architecture. 141   Such 
technological design makes most online speech anonymous. 142  
Because of the anonymous nature of the Internet, it is very difficult 
to locate the speakers in the human flesh search engine, let alone to 
punish them.143  Furthermore, the Internet allows oversea Internet 
users to participate in the human flesh search engine, and seeking 
remedies against them is particularly difficult, if not impossible.  This, 
of course, does not mean that those offending Internet users should 
escape accountability.144  Still, most participants of the human flesh 
search engine are effectively liability-proof. 
A more effective, practical option is to hold the Internet 
intermediaries liable.145  That is to sue the Internet intermediaries 
who directly participate in the human flesh search engine or indirectly 
provide the platforms for users to conduct the human flesh search 
engine.  From the perspective of the victims, Internet intermediaries 
are not only easier to find, but also have deeper pockets and are thus 
                                                                                                               
 141 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 31–33 
(2008); David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey, Jr., The Accountable 
Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 9, 82 (2004). 
 142 Although some countries (such as South Korea and China) have attempted to 
implement real-name systems in the Internet, there are always technological solutions that 
can be used to circumvent such systems and to maintain anonymity. 
 143 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 859 (2000) (“[T]he typical John Doe [defendant] has neither deep pockets 
nor libel insurance from which to satisfy a defamation judgment.”). 
 144 In the United States, prosecutors have attempted to employ the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, which was originally designed to punish and deter hackers from breaking into 
computer systems to obtain private information, to prosecute cyberharassers.  See, e.g., Linda 
Deutsch, Teen’s Neighbor Charged in Death, WASH. POST, C3 (May 16, 2008). 
 145 Many commentators suggest holding Internet service providers liable for online 
infringement.  See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 81, at 149–59; Nancy S. Kim, Web Site 
Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1026-33 (2009); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 986, 1010-15 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 
6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 108–10, 112–13 (2007); Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster 
and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 1154 (2007); Doug Lichtman & Eric 
Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 233–
40 (2006); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 
1095–1101 (2001); Brian McManus, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service 
Providers, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 661–68 (2001).  
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more financially attractive targets for litigation.146  More importantly, 
as some commentators note, Internet intermediaries are in a better 
position to monitor and deter online infringement at lower costs.147 
The more challenging question is which liability regime shall 
be adopted for Internet intermediaries?  In the United States, although 
Internet content providers are likely to be held liable for online 
infringement, Section 230 provides almost absolute immunity to 
Internet service providers, and only a number of legal claims (such as 
copyright infringement) 148  can pierce such immunity. 149   As 
demonstrated below, if China were to take this approach, victims of 
the human flesh search engine would lack meaningful redress.  
Modestly reforming the absolute immunity shield could give them 
effective options.  The author argues that the notice-based liability 
against Internet service providers, which is being used in the online 
copyright regulation in the United States, is more effective than 
absolute immunity in regulating the human flesh search engine. 
First, when Section 230 was passed twenty years ago, the oft-
cited argument for Section 230 immunity was that the Internet was a 
young industry and Section 230 was established to “maintain the 
robust nature of Internet communication” and to “preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services.” 150   But today, the Internet 
industryhas become mature, robust and much more financed.151  They 
are now capable, and socially responsible, to spend money and 
                                                                                                               
 146 See Scot Wilson, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between 
Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 555 (2002) (stating most 
plaintiffs in “cybersmear” campaigns would rather sue those who can pay more, i.e. the 
Internet service providers). 
 147 Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 237 (2006). 
 148 In the United States, the copyright industry (especially the Recording Industry 
Association of America and its analogue in the movie industry, the Motion Picture 
Association of America) has spent great effort in limiting section 230 immunity since its 
promulgation.  This is not a novel phenomenon in the history of intellectual property law.  
As William Landes and Richard Posner demonstrate, the political forces that favor 
intellectual property right owners contributes to the increase of intellectual property 
protection since 1976.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25 (2004). 
 149 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (1998). 
 150 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998); see generally 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (August 4, 1995) 
(explaining legislative purposes). 
 151 YOO, supra note 6, at 128–34. 
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manpower on screening and filtering illegal content—they have 
already done this for online copyright infringement. 
Second, absolute immunity might well create disincentives to 
Internet intermediaries in developing new kind of self-regulating 
technologies or services that might threaten their existing way of 
doing business.  For example, in the United States, AT&T was 
uninterested in developing Internet technologies decades ago because 
doing so would threaten its control of the phone system.152  Indeed, 
under an absolute liability regime, Internet intermediaries’ best 
strategy is to remain passive and abstain from incurring any cost of 
deploying affirmative technologies or services.  However, notice-
based liability might well give incentives for Internet intermediaries, 
especially those wealthy ones, to develop detecting, filtering, and 
abuse-reporting mechanisms to weed out potential offensive online 
speech in the human flesh search engine. 
This has been proved in the area of online copyright 
protection.  The U.S. Congress provided strong incentives under 
Section 512 of Digital Millennium Copyright Act for Internet service 
providers to take down access to websites that were allegedly 
violating copyright.153  With the notice-based liability imposed by 
Section 512, Internet intermediaries were impelled to develop various 
kinds of viable copyright protection technologies, such as digital 
watermarking, digital fingerprinting, and digital rights management 
systems, which have made a substantial progress in detecting and 
preventing plagiarism and copyright violations.  Similarly, imposing 
a notice-based liability in the area of online privacy protection can 
incentivize the Internet industry to develop technological solutions to 
monitor and filter privacy infringement content, thereby alleviating 
the problem of the human flesh search engine. 
Exercising editorial control and judgement over its services is 
not uncommon for Internet service providers, and it can be beneficial 
to them.  Of course, the Internet has lowered the costs of content 
transmission and distribution, thereby increasing the participation by 
a large number of Internet users.  However, the proliferation of 
offensive speech about private individuals and of private concerns is 
of little value to societal wellbeing.  When this offensive speech 
                                                                                                               
 152 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 31–33 (2002). 
 153 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY, 190–
91 (2004). 
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occupied the front pages, it would likely decrease the visibility of 
valuable discussion and make the entire online community less 
trustworthy and accountable.  Thus, the online world would become 
less attractive to Internet users.  This is why most BBS administrators 
monitor the online community and delete useless postings such as 
unwanted solicitation and personal insults. 
Tianya itself is an example.  According to Tianya’s “User 
Agreement,” users of Tianya are required to refrain from posting 
certain content including solicitation, obscenity, hate speech, libel, 
rumors, etc.  Tianya is allowed to remove these online postings 
without informing their users.154  Moreover, Tianya, like other major 
BBS in China, utilizes both human monitors and screening 
technologies, which prescreens BBS postings for illegal and 
offensive language. 155   In other words, unlike traditional news 
vendors and bookstores, Tianya has the ability to continually monitor 
online postings and in fact does spend time and effort for censoring 
online postings.  This ability is amplified by the growth of its 
monitoring team and the development of the data analytical 
technologies.  Tianya’s decision to regulate the content of its BBS 
was partially influenced by the existing political speech control in 
China, and partially incentivized by its own desire to attract a market 
consisting of users seeking a user-friendly BBS environment. 
Indeed, some of these monitoring and filtering strategies 
would actually benefit the Internet service providers themselves.  
Internet users are more likely to choose Internet services that are more 
credible (such as editing entries in Wikipedia) or more user-friendly 
(such as filtering spams in email service).  Because of this, regulating 
content in the human flesh search engine could make the online 
service less offensive and more trustworthy to Internet users.  In the 
long run, it would help to build a better online environment that 
would benefit Internet service providers. 
Third, Section 230 removes liability from Internet service 
providers, which would in turn encourages Internet service providers 
to take reckless actions and allows Internet service providers to turn 
                                                                                                               
 154 Tianya Yonghu Xieyi ( ) [Tianya’s User Agreement], http://service.
tianya.cn/guize/regist.do [https://perma.cc/7P6R-CH4Y] (last visited Nov. 22, 2016). 
 155 CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON CHINA, BLOCKING, FILTERING, AND MONITORING, 
http://www.cecc.gov/blocking-filtering-and-monitoring [https://perma.cc/68UE-WJ9P] 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2016). 
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a blind eye to problems.156  The Ninth Circuit noted in Batzel v. Smith 
that “the broad immunity created by Section 230 can sometimes lead 
to troubling results,” such as providing no incentive for a website 
owner to take down a post after being informed it is defamatory 
nature.157 
This leads to the final point: absolute immunity to Internet 
service providers would leave victims of the human flesh search 
engine vulnerable and helpless.  One might argue that victims, in one 
way or another, can seek judicial remedies by filing a civil action.  
Such remedies, however, suffer from both legal and practical defects.  
As a legal matter, the damage is difficult to be evaluated during the 
course of the human flesh search engine.  This is especially so 
considering that data on the Internet is almost impossible to be 
completely deleted.  The scope of legal relief available is thus greatly 
constrained.  As a practical matter, the remedies become even more 
difficult to achieve.  As discussed above, the anonymous nature of 
the Internet make it almost impossible to track down all the violators.  
Even if the violators were eventually identified, legal action against 
them requires the expenditure of time and effort, while ultimate 
vindication may be long delayed and bring little relief to victims of 
the human flesh search engine under the Chinese legal system. 
One of the most powerful criticism against notice-based 
liability for Internet service providers is that they would have 
incentives to simply remove all messages for which they receive 
notice of defamatory content because they face liability for 
maintaining the message but not for removing it.  This so-called 
“Proxy Censorship” or “Collateral Censorship” would raise a First 
Amendment concern in the U.S. context.158  Nonetheless, opponents 
underestimate a factor that the business model of most Internet 
service providers is predicated on large volumes of traffic and data 
                                                                                                               
 156 Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online 
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 418 (2009); see also SOLOVE, supra note 81, at 
159. 
 157 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 158 See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet 
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27–9 (2006); 
Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 
90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2095–98 (2004); Jack Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2296–2305 (1999); Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and 
Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the “Speaker” Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 79, 116, 118 (1995). 
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flowing through their services, which incentivizes these Internet 
service providers to generate as much traffic and data as possible.159  
As a result, the profit-maximizing Internet service providers are more 
likely to allow the dissemination of gossip, rumor, and personal 
information, even if they are vicious, aggressive and harmful, rather 
than removing all suspicious content.  This is especially seen in the 
human flesh search engine, where infringing content is typically not 
marginal, and usually serves as a draw that attracts large Internet 
audiences and traffic.  In other words, the business model incentivizes 
Internet service providers to try their best to utilize the content of the 
human flesh search engine in order to promote Internet traffic through 
their servers.  Furthermore, market forces will discipline massive 
removal of online content.160  The human flesh search engine always 
involves multiple online communities at the same time.  Since there 
are alternative online communities, Internet users can simply change 
Internet service providers if their posts were repeatedly removed at a 
particular online community.  Last but not least, as discussed above, 
the speech in the human flesh search engine deserves less First 
Amendment protection.161 
Indeed, compared to absolute immunity, notice-based liability 
provides some disincentives for Internet service providers to conduct 
massive removal of online content; compared to strict liability,162 
notice-based liability provides a warrant of proportionality in 
regulating online speech.163  Having said that, we need to caution 
against imposing too high of a burden to Internet service providers, 
which will be reflected in the below policy recommendations. 
                                                                                                               
 159 As Paul Ohm notes, Internet service providers attempts to replicate Google’s 
successful utilization of behavioral data, which are being turned into advertising revenue.  
See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1426 (2009) (explaining Google’s success and the response to Google’s success). 
 160 Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 252 (2006). 
 161 See supra Part III, Sections B and C (explaining that some speech receives less 
protection than others and why). 
 162 See Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916 
(2002) (elaborating that strict liability for Internet service providers can cause over-
deterrence and over-censorship). 
 163 An accompanying policy is the counter-notice and put-back procedures. Both China 
and the U.S. has the same kind of policy in online copyright regulation. See 17 U.S.C. §512(g) 
(2010); Xinxi Wangluo Chuanboquan Baohu Tiaoli ( ) 
[Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Communicate Works to the Public Over 
Information Networks] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 18, 2006, amended on Jan. 30, 
2013), art. 16, 17. 
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In the Wang Fei case, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court 
actually applied the notice-based liability and held one of the Internet 
service providers liable. 164   The Beijing Chaoyang District Court 
maintained that, as a condition for limited liability, Internet service 
providers must expeditiously take down the content they host when 
they are notified of the alleged illegality.165  The Beijing Chaoyang 
District Court followed the analogy of the notice-based liability, and 
held that Daqi failed to fulfill the take-down obligation and thus were 
liable.166  Following the same rationale, since Tianya took down the 
disputed threads and posts in a “timely” manner upon receiving the 
removal request from Wang Fei, it would not be liable for the privacy 
infringement in this case.167 
Later in the year, this notice-based liability regime was 
established in the newly promulgated Tort Law of the PRC, under 
which Internet intermediaries would be held liable if they failed to 
take necessary action upon receiving notice from the victim or it has 
the knowledge of the online infringement. 168   This notice-based 
                                                                                                               
 164 The Wang Fei case is the first case where Chinese Courts held Internet service 
providers liable in the human flesh search engine.  However, Chinese Courts have previously 
held Internet service providers liable in online copyright infringement cases.  See, e.g., 
Beijing Ciwen Yingshi Zhizuo Youxian Gongsi Su Guangzhou Shulian Ruanjian Jishu 
Youxian Gongsi ( ) [Beijing 
Ciwen Studio Inc. v. Guangzhou Shulian Software Technology Co. Ltd.], (Guangzhou 
Higher People’s Ct. 2006); Zhejiang Fanya Dianzi Shangwu Youxian Gongsi Su Beijing 
Yahuwang Zixun Fuwu Youxian Gongsi, Beijing Alibaba Xinxi Jishu Youxian Gongsi (
) [Zhejiang Flyasia E-business Co., Ltd v. Beijing Yahoo! Consulting and Service 
Co., Ltd. & Beijing Alibaba Information Technology Co. Ltd.], (Beijing No. 2 Interm. Ct. 
Dec. 15, 2006); Shanghai Busheng Yinyue Wenhua Chunabo Youxian Gongsi Su Beijing 
[FashioNow] Gongsi ( ) [Shanghai Push 
Sound Music & Entm’t. Co., Ltd. v. Beijing FashioNow Co.], (Beijing No. 2 Interm. Ct. Dec. 
19, 2006); Guangzhou Shulian Ruanjian Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Guangdong Zhongkai 
Wenhua Fazhan Youxian Gongsi (
) [Guangzhou Shulian Software Technology Co., Ltd. v. Guangdong Zoke Culture 
Development Co., Ltd.], (Shanghai Higher People’s Court Feb. 21, 2008).  For more 
discussion about intermediary liability of online copyright infringement in China, see Ke 
Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers’ Vicarious Liability Versus Regulation of Copyright 
Infringement in China, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375, 389–99 (2011). 
 165 Wang Fei Su Daqi Wang, supra note 37. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Wang Fei Su Tianya, supra note 47. 
 168 Article 36 of Tort Law provides that: 
 
Internet users and internet service providers shall bear tortious 
liability in the event they infringe other people’s civil rights and 
interests through the internet. Where an internet user engages in 
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liability regime was further established in the Decision Concerning 
Strengthening Network Information Protection of 2012.169 
However, the court’s decisions are not without criticism.  The 
most crucial one is that the Beijing Chaoyang District Court did not 
specify the reasonable time-frame for the take-down action.  In the 
Wang Fei case, it took Tianya more than three months to take down 
the relevant postings.  Considering the speedy dissemination of 
information on the Internet, Wang Fei can still argue that Tianya’s 
take-down action is not “timely” at all. 
Therefore, in order to better regulate the human flesh search 
engine, the first policy recommendation to Chinese policymakers is 
to specify the time-frame for notice-based liability.  The law could 
provide a more concrete standard to determine whether Internet 
                                                                                                               
tortious conduct through internet services, the injured party shall 
have the right to inform the internet service provider that it should 
take necessary action such as by deleting content, screening, 
breaking links, etc. Where an internet service provider fails to take 
necessary action after being informed, it shall be jointly and 
severally liable with the internet user with regard to the additional 
injury or damage suffered. Where an internet service provider 
knows an internet user is infringing other people’s civil rights and 
interests through its internet service but fails to take necessary 
action, it shall be jointly and severally liable with the internet user. 
 
Qinquan Zeren Fa ( ) [Tort Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), official full text, in Chinese, available 
at: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm [https://perma.cc/38EY-
RJL2]. 
 169 Article 8 of the decision provides that 
 
Where citizens discover that their individual identity has been 
divulged, individual privacy has been disseminated or other 
network information infringes their lawful rights and interests, or 
are harassed by commercial electronic information, they have the 
power to require the network service provider to delete the relevant 
information or adopt other necessary measures to cease this. 
 
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Wangluo Xinxi 
Baohu de Jueding ( ) 
[National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision Concerning Strengthening 
Network Information Protection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-12/28/
content_2301231.htm [https://perma.cc/8QCJ-PRHW.  To date, this decision is the highest 
level law in China to regulate online privacy infringement.  Violation of the notice-based 
liability standard may lead to warnings, fines, confiscation of illegal income, cancellation of 
operation permits, shut-down of websites, or the prohibition of involved entities from 
engaging in other network services business. 
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service providers take down infringing content in a timely manner.  
Infringing content in a human flesh search engine is usually time-
sensitive.  As a general rule, such content is most devastating 
immediately after the incident.  With the passage of time, the value 
of content diminishes.  As a result, if the infringing content were 
available for a relatively long time, by the time such content is finally 
taken down, the take-down action may well be less meaningful.  Such 
time-frame shall be subject to the best available technologies 
(particularly, the ex-ante detecting, filtering and ex-post reporting, 
deleting technologies) in a given time. 
Second, since undue burden is a concern, when applying 
notice-based liability against Internet service providers, policymakers 
need to limit unnecessary take-down requests. 170   Naturally, the 
victims are better positioned to determine whether information about 
him or her is infringing or defamatory.  The law could place some 
burden of the exercise of notice against the victims.  For example, the 
law could require victims to provide the real identity of themselves, 
to bear the burden of demonstrating that the online speech at issue is 
illicit, to provide accurate information about the alleged infringement, 
and to file the complaints through an authorized, designated system 
or a licensed lawyer.171  In practice, this might well increase the 
                                                                                                               
 170 Perhaps the best recent illustration of this concern in the United States can be found 
in the Zeran case.  See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 333 (discussing the risk of strategic “notice” to 
ISPs to suppress content).  For information on cases regarding the potential abuses of notice 
and take down system in China, see Si Xiao & Fan Luqiong (  & ), Tengxun 
Yanjiuyuan ( ) [Tencent Research Institute], Zhishi Chanquan Lingyu “Tongzhi 
– Shanchu” Guizi Lanyong de Falv Guizhi) (
) [Legal Regulation Against Abuse of “Notice and Take-Down” Rules in 
Intellectual Property Area] (2015), http://www.tencentresearch.com/4014 [https://perma.cc/
A9PY-QESD].  
 171 Similar legislative efforts have been made in online copyright regulation.  See Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu Shenli Sheji Jisuanji Wangluo Zhuzuoquan Qinquan Jiufen Anjian 
Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi” (
) [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in Hearing Cases Involving 
Computer Networks Copyright Dispute] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 22, 
2000, first amendment made on Dec. 22, 2003, second amendment made on Dec. 8, 2006) 
(When filing a complaint or a notice to Internet service provider, article 7 of the 
Interpretation requires copyright owners to provide identity certification, proof of copyright 
ownership, and proof of copyright infringement.).  See also Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Quan 
Baohu Tiaoli ( ) [Regulation on the Protection of the Right to 
Communicate Works to the Public over Information Networks] (promulgated by the St. 
Council, May 18, 2006, amended on Jan. 30, 2013) (providing in article 14 that copyright 
owners are entitled to submit written notification to the Internet service providers about 
alleged infringement, and that the notification shall include (1) the name, contact information 
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accuracy of the complaints, the efficiency of the review process, and 
prevent the abuse of such notice-based liability.  In the meantime, 
doing so would also help alleviate the risk-averse disposition by 
Internet intermediaries such as deleting too much lawful content upon 
receiving notices.172 
Third, Internet intermediaries shall be incentivized to 
cooperate with victims and law enforcement agencies—a cooperation 
towards an optimal mechanism to address the problems of the human 
flesh search engine.  Internet intermediaries usually have access to 
some sorts of information about their subscribers such as registration 
information and IP addresses.  As a result, Internet intermediaries are 
often in a better position to help locate and investigate the offensive 
Internet users who are allegedly engaging in the human flesh search 
engine. 173   This may greatly reduce the cost for detecting and 
deterring the human flesh search engine. 
Most victims of the human flesh search engine lack financial 
wherewithal to engage in lengthy and expensive public reputation 
management or legal battles.  They have a greater need of assistance 
from Internet intermediaries in order to timely cease infringement or 
seek remedies.  Wealthy victims of the human flesh search engine 
may hire a public reputation management company that specializes 
in removing damaging online content or launching legal battles.  
However, the chances of success of such action also highly depend 
on cooperation with relevant Internet intermediaries. 
Admittedly, such cooperation is a burden for Internet 
intermediaries; but in a long run, Internet intermediaries would 
benefit from having a healthier and cleaner online community.  The 
law could encourage closer cooperation between the Internet 
intermediaries, victims and law enforcement, which would better 
                                                                                                               
and address of copyright owners; (2) the name and web link of the infringing content; and 
(3) proof of copyright infringement). 
 172 As some commentators noted, liabilities will tend to increase incentives of risk-
adverse entities to over-comply.  See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 986 (1984) 
(explaining biased damage awards). 
 173 See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 236–38 (2006) (arguing that Internet service 
providers are usually capable to detect, deter, or otherwise influence the illicit acts in 
question at low costs); Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1148, 1154 (2007) (explaining that when a third party is better positioned to monitor and 
control of the primary wrongdoer, imposing indirect liability against the third party will be 
more efficient). 
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help victims in the human flesh search engine and punish the 
offensive Internet users. 
Finally, let us not forget the analysis of the tension between 
privacy and free speech as discussed above.  The law should consider 
the distinction between private individuals and notable public figures.  
Speech of public concerns and of private concern shall also be taken 
into account.  An incident of the human flesh search engine might 
well involve multiple parties and multiple affairs, and these nuanced 
distinction could help better evaluate the situation.  Policy makers 
shall also focus on restrictions on online speech about private 
individuals and of private concern in the human flesh search 
engine.174 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, the author has endeavored to examine the 
problems of the human flesh search engine by exploring the tension 
between privacy and free speech in the Internet age.  Through legal 
analysis, we are able to answer the questions set forth in the first 
Chapter.  If online speech is about private individuals (as opposed to 
public officials and celebrities) and of private concern (as opposed to 
public concern), the value of privacy should trump the value of free 
speech.  The author does not hold that speech about private 
individuals and of private concern should not be protected at all.  
However, when we look closely at the kind of speech in the Wang 
Fei case and most of the human flesh search engine cases, certain 
restrictions on such speech are more justifiable.  Even in the United 
States, a jurisdiction where speech is highly protected by the First 
Amendment, privacy values might well trump speech values in this 
particular circumstance. 
Indeed, Wang Fei suffered a great deal from the human flesh 
search engine, and he was disproportionally punished in the course of 
public humiliation and online shaming.  In the pre-Internet age, the 
disclosure of negative personal information among individuals could 
damage one’s reputation but it would fade from memories over time.  
In ancient China, only those who committed serious crimes might be 
punished by the practice of the “Mo” (punitive face tattooing), one of 
the Five Punishments for Slaves (Nu Li Zhi Wu Xing), in which 
                                                                                                               
 174 See supra Part III (discussing the balance of privacy and free speech). 
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criminals would be tattooed on the face or forehead with indelible ink.  
Admittedly, even today, criminal cases may involve shaming 
penalties encouraging social stigmatization of criminal offenders.175  
However, it should be noted that, in a non-criminal case like that of 
Wang Fei, the brutal practice of face tattooing was brought back in 
the Internet age, not through the law, but through digital 
technologies—the ‘code.’176  What otherwise would be a fleeting 
memory in the minds of a few bystanders are now scrutinized brutally 
and endlessly on the Internet.  And due to the nature of digital 
technologies, such shaming penalties are inherently difficult to 
control, which might well constitute a form of mob justice.177 
When considering liability for Internet intermediaries, policy 
makers generally have two options: absolute immunity and notice-
based liability.  Absolute immunity, as illustrated in the United States, 
would give victims of the human flesh search engine little meaningful 
likelihood of success in seeking judicial remedies.  Instead, notice-
based liability to Internet intermediaries, as applied by the Chinese 
court, can not only offer victims effective options to redress, and but 
also incentivize Internet intermediaries to self-regulate towards better 
online communities.  In light of these observation and discussion, 
some recommendations are made to policymakers. 
Up to now this essay has provided some basic aspects of the 
problems of the human flesh search engine and how to address related 
legal issues.  It is impossible to generalize from one case, but the 
Wang Fei case provides a means to develop an understanding of how 
networked individuals can be empowered and driven by the human 
flesh search engine, how to balance the interests of free speech and 
the interests of privacy, and establishes an expectation for the 
remedies for the victims of the human flesh search engine.  It could 
become part of a comparative study on regulation of cyberbullying, 
cyberharassment and cyberstalking.  There is a very broad space 
waiting for further exploration on the tension between privacy and 
free speech in the Internet age. 
 
                                                                                                               
 175 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM: HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 
227–50 (2004) (discussing the effects of shaming penalties). 
 176 For more discussion about the importance of the ‘code,’ see LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE: VERSION 2.0, 1–8 (2d rev. ed. 2006). 
 177 James Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?. 107 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1087–91 (1998). 
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